ULTra Personal Rapid Transit System

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Regulatory Approval

UK Procedures

Safety has been a prime consideration throughout the development of the ULTra System. ULTra PRT has involved the UK’s Regulatory Authority ORR/HMRI (now part of the Office of Rail Regulation) and more recently the Safety Verification Team (SVT).

The safety of the ULTra System as a concept was assessed in the Concept Safety Paper produced in 2000. The Company received a ‘letter of no objection’ to the ULTra concept from HMRI in 2000. The Company also produced a Safety Case for passenger trials at the Company’s test track in Cardiff in 2003. Again the Company sought and received ‘letters of no objection’ from HMRI for passenger trials involving members of the public.

In 2006, following the introduction of new UK legislation (ROGS), ULTra PRT set up an independent ‘competent person’ to verify that the safety claims made by the Company are justifiable, in conformity with the new legislation. The role of the ‘competent person’ is undertaken by the SVT.

More recently the Company produced an application specific Concept Safety Paper. This paper considered the safety of the application of the ULTra system providing a transport link between Heathrow Terminal 5 and the T5 Business Car Park. The SVT reviewed the paper and on the evidence and analysis presented stated:

  • The approach adopted was appropriate, and
  • There are no features of the ULTra design concept and operating concept that would indicate that the level of safety of the ULTra system, once designed in detail for the Heathrow PRT Phase 1 application, would be unacceptable.

In 2008, ULTra PRT, BAA and the SVT established a set of Safety Targets for the operation of the Heathrow PRT Phase 1 system to commence. These were:

  • The risk of causing a fatality is Broadly Acceptable as defined by HSE, and
  • The risk of causing a fatality or serious injury (measured in F&SI) is no worse than the equivalent bus service, and
  • All risks are acceptable to an ethical and responsible company.

The Safety Case for the Heathrow application builds on the previous documents and presents the case and the supporting evidence to support the assertion that the System meets the Safety Targets and is acceptably safe to commence the Operating Phase. A diverse set of approaches to the assessment of the safety of the ULTra System has been adopted in the Safety Case because of the new and novel nature of the system, which are given in more detail on the Safety Verification page.

US procedures

ULTra is compatible with federal and state PRT safety standards as well as national fire escape code. There will be approximately 361 different “safety cases” for any PRT implementation, covering: earthquake, truck crashes into column, falling debris, fire, bad people, extreme weather, vehicle fails on guideway, slipping on stairs, etc.

The process by which UK ULTra safety approvals were obtained (see above) is similar to that employed within the US.

In the U.S., Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 659 delegates fixed guideway (PRT, APM, monorail, LRT, heavy rail, cable car, and heritage trolley) public transit safety certification to the states, with a series of minimum requirements placed on each state’s regulatory agency. CFR 659 envisions mature transit systems and, accordingly, is less rigorous about “designing safety in” in comparison to the UK Rail Authority safety regime. There are 44 regulated fixed guideway systems in 27 states.

There are four important CFR 659 definitions which ULTra PRT will employ:

  • Safety means freedom from harm resulting from unintentional acts or circumstances.
  • Security means freedom from harm resulting from intentional acts or circumstances.
  • System Safety Program Plan (or SSPP) means a document developed and adopted by the rail transit agency, describing its safety policies, objectives, responsibilities, and procedures.
  • System Security Plan (or SSP) means a document developed and adopted by the rail transit agency describing its security policies, objectives, responsibilities, and procedures.

The CFR 659 process follows the same generic steps for any state, with a few customizations within each state implementation:

A Rail Transit Agency (RTA) is formed to operate an ULTra system

  • The RTA informs the state fixed guideway safety regulator of intent to operate a fixed guideway system.
  • A competent, independent safety team is formed to certify the ULTra system. The state regulator is required to analyze the qualifications of the safety team and approve the team.
  • A Safety Certification Plan is written and reviewed at least 12 months before approval to operate is given.
  • The SSPP and SSP are written, following applicable standards. For PRT certification, the ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers) APM Standards, Parts I-IV should be followed.
  • Once documentation is in order and commissioning has completed, a public hearing is held to grant safety certification, allowing the ULTra system to begin operation.
  • Once a system begins operation, the RTA is expected to conduct internal safety audits.

This CFR 659 process can be closely matched to existing Heathrow ULTra Safety Certification documentation, with implementation-specific modifications. Many of the 361 Heathrow “hazard cases” can be copied over directly. The current Heathrow ULTra documentation is closely matched to the ASCE APM Standards and an ASCE compliance matrix was developed for BAA at Heathrow.

BAA and ULTra PRT have had representation on the ASCE APM Committee for a number of years and are active in evolving the APM standard to better comprehend PRT. For early ULTra systems, the existing standards are acceptable.

ULTra PRT has found that engagement with the relevant safety authorities at an early stage provides the surest route to successful approval.

NFPA130 Evacuation

ULTra’s non-electrified passive guideway meets U.S. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 130: Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems. For NFPA evacuation requirements, ULTra passengers may exit the front of the vehicle and safely walk on the guideway.

Safety rails are attached to the guideway, primarily for safety of maintenance personnel, but the rails also serve to ensure safety of evacuating passengers.